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Abstract One of the reasons for deadlock in global climate policy is countries’ disagreement
on how to share the mitigation burden. Normative theory suggests various fairness criteria for
structuring burden sharing, most prominently, historical responsibility for emissions, economic
capacity, and vulnerability to climate change. Governments have taken up these criteria in their
rhetoric at UNFCCC negotiations. I examine whether normative criteria influence individual
burden sharing preferences. This bottom-up perspective is important for two reasons. First, it is
unknown if governments’ fairness rhetoric matches citizens’ actual preferences. Second,
international climate agreements directly affect individuals through domestic policy measures
(e.g. energy taxes), and therefore require domestic public support for successful implementa-
tion. I conducted two laboratory experiments where participants have to agree on how to share
climate change mitigation costs in an ultimatum game. Treatment conditions include differ-
ences between proposer and responder in capacity, vulnerability (experiment 1), and historical
emissions (experiment 2). Historical emissions are endogenously determined in a prior game.
Capacity inequality strongly affects burden sharing, with richer players ending up paying
more, and poorer players less. Vulnerability differences reduce the influence of fairness,
leading to suggested cost distributions more unfavorable to vulnerable players. However,
vulnerable responders still reject many “unfair” offers. Differences in historical responsibility
result in cost distributions strongly correlated with players’ relative contributions to climate
change. The results suggest that more nuanced consideration of fairness criteria in burden
sharing could make ambitious climate agreements more acceptable for reluctant countries and
their citizens.
1 Introduction
In global climate negotiations, countries have so far not managed to agree on how to share the
burden of mitigation amongst themselves, which critically hampers negotiation progress. The
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“common but differentiated responsibilities” principle formulated in Article 3 of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) engendered the distinction between
Annex-I and non-Annex-I countries in the Kyoto Protocol, but this rough arrangement has
intensified rather than resolved the debate about fair burden sharing (Kallbekken 2014).
Whereas many developed countries are reluctant to step up their mitigation activities as
long as major emerging economies reject similar commitments, those and other developing
countries expect the developed world to bear an even larger share of the burden. These
diverging positions result from the use of different criteria to determine burden allocation:
current or historical responsibility, ability to pay, emissions per capita, and vulnerability to
climate change, among the more frequently used (Hayward 2012; Baer 2013). These criteria
reflect different, but not mutually exclusive, conceptions of distributive justice. Governments
frequently invoke these principles in negotiations and public debate to justify their stance on
burden sharing (Ringius et al. 2002; International Institute for Sustainable Development
2012b; Stalley 2012; Lange et al. 2010).
Yet while fairness principles for burden sharing in global climate governance have been
extensively analyzed theoretically (Gardiner 2010; Adger et al. 2006; Arnold 2011), and
politics has taken up the resulting arguments, empirical research on individual preferences
for such principles is scant. In this article I report two experiments investigating the influence
of fairness criteria on individual burden sharing preferences. My goal is to identify which
fairness principles (if any) individuals take into account for allocating mitigation costs.
What individual citizens perceive as fair in burden sharing matters, first, because govern-
ments often claim to follow domestic public opinion when insisting on certain fairness
principles in the UNFCCC negotiations, yet it is unknown whether those principles reflect
citizen preferences. Second, any effective international climate agreement directly affects
individuals through domestic policy measures (e.g. on energy supply and use), and therefore
requires (at least in democracies) public support for successful implementation.
I conducted two interactive lab experiments where pairs of participants have to allocate
mitigation costs between themselves. A proposer suggests how to split total costs (to be paid
from each players endowment), and a responder accepts or rejects this suggestion. In case of
rejection, both players lose part of their endowment due to a “climate catastrophe”.1 Treatment
conditions vary players’ ability to pay, vulnerability, and historical responsibility. Results show
that both ability to pay and historical responsibility are strong determinants of agreed cost
distributions. Vulnerability mitigates the influence of other fairness criteria, as vulnerable
players bargaining position is weaker.
Many studies have experimentally investigated different aspects of global climate gover-
nance, mostly using public good games (e.g. Milinski et al. 2008; Tavoni et al. 2011; Sturm
andWeimann 2006). Some focus on players’ properties like ability to pay (Brekke et al. 2012).
Klinsky et al. (2012) use structured decision analysis to study differences in individuals’ justice
rationales regarding mitigation and adaptation. Yet to my knowledge, no study has so far tested
fairness criteria for burden sharing in an experimental game setting.
Section 2 of this article outlines normative-theoretical burden sharing principles and their
relation to individual fairness perceptions. Section 3 presents the experimental design and
results for capacity and vulnerability, Section 4 those for historical responsibility. Section 5
discusses and synthesizes results, and Section 6 concludes.
1 This is a variation of the ultimatum game. In its simplest form the proposer suggests how to split an amount of
money between him and the responder. If the responder accepts, money is paid out accordingly, if she rejects,
none of them receive any money.
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2 Burden sharing principles: from normative theory to individual fairness perceptions
2.1 Burden sharing principles in political theory
The 2° climate policy target implies substantial emission reductions by many countries
compared to business-as-usual scenarios (Fuessler et al. 2012), requiring large investments
over the coming decades. Thus, whereas internationally allocating emission budgets has been
framed as a common pool resource issue (Ostrom et al. 2002; Messner et al. 2010; Young
2014), the actual reduction efforts necessary to stay within those budgets are more appropri-
ately viewed as contributions to the public good of climate change mitigation (e.g. Barrett and
Dannenberg 2012; Milinski et al. 2008; Stone 2009). This mitigation burden has to be shared
among countries.
I focus on substantive, as distinguished from procedural, fairness principles discussed in
theoretical literature (Ringius et al. 2002: 5), because the former directly determine the material
outcomes of burden sharing arrangements (which actor has to invest how much into mitiga-
tion). Most frequently used equity-based criteria are actors’ causal responsibility and ability to
pay (Hayward 2012; Page 2008). The needs-based criterion vulnerability to climate change is
particularly salient in the adaptation context, but is often used concerning mitigation, too (Baer
2013; Ikeme 2003).
Causal responsibility principles essentially state that those who contributed most to the
problem of climate change should also carry the largest burden in mitigating it. Theorists
frequently advocate this “polluter-pays” approach as basis for burden sharing (Caney 2005;
Gosseries 2004; Meyer and Roser 2010). To apply it in a fair way, however, more nuanced
specifications are necessary (Ringius et al. 2002). First, responsibility can be measured based
on current or accumulated historical emissions. An argument for using current emissions is that
the polluter-pays principle is a means to influence contemporary behavior by internalizing
environmental emissions costs (Stevens 1994). However, due to CO2’s persistence in the
atmosphere, its stock matters more than current flows–which favours using historical emis-
sions, since long-time big emitters have contributed more to climate change (Neumayer 2000;
Baer et al. 2000). Consequentially, the recent literature seems to favor historical responsibility
(Hayward 2012). Yet this raises the issue of whether current agents can be held liable for an
action earlier generations committed (Moellendorf 2009), and whose harmfulness those
generations were not aware of (Shue 1999; Miller 2008), since most historical emissions
occurred when their impact on climate was unknown or highly uncertain. Therefore, some
advocate accounting only for emissions after 1990, when the first IPCC Assessment Report
was published (e.g. Miller 2008).
The ability-to-pay principle holds that mitigation burden should be shared in accordance
with economic capacity (Baer 2013). Distributive justice is thus achieved by allocating
collective costs in line with actors’ capacity to carry them. Requiring substantive mitigation
action from poor countries, which would benefit also rich ones, embodies poor-to-rich
transfers that are objectionable in this view (Caney 2005; Carlson 2009). On pragmatic
matters, this principle is easy to apply compared to the complicated attribution of causal
responsibility (Hayward 2012).
Vulnerability as burden sharing criterion derives from a needs- rather than equity-based
distributive justice norm (Konow 2010), and thus from ethics of compassion rather than of
obligation (Adger and Nicholson-Cole 2011; Gardiner 2006). Those likely to suffer drastic
negative consequences from climate change should receive assistance from the less vulnerable.
Theorists usually propose some combination of these principles (Page 2008), for example, a
polluter-pays approach attributing responsibility only where possible, and allocating the
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“remainder” according to actors’ capacity (Caney 2010). The Greenhouse Development Rights
Framework uses a “responsibility-capacity indicator” to allocate emissions rights and mitiga-
tion obligations (Baer et al. 2009).
2.2 Burden sharing principles in the UNFCCC process and the relevance of individual fairness
perceptions
Theorists state that burden allocations are rather similar no matter which principle is applied
(Ringius et al. 2002; Caney 2005; Baer et al. 2000). Developed countries should carry the
largest burden because of their high economic capacity, large historical emissions, and huge
benefits from emissions. Moreover, they are likely to be the least vulnerable countries.
However, recent empirical estimates and simulations of burden sharing rules show that
different principles can result in different allocations, especially concerning large emerging
economies (Fuessler et al. 2012; Elzen and Lucas 2005).
International climate politics has partly taken up the academic discussion. “Common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” implies the need for burden sharing
criteria. Nevertheless, while several burden sharing proposals have been debated, a generally
accepted arrangement has not emerged.
The UNFCCC stalemate is largely due to the difficulty of aligning interests of multiple
heterogeneous negotiation parties (Victor 2011). Yet governments often invoke fairness
principles, even if frequently picking those accommodating their country’s economic self
interest (Lange et al. 2010). Large emerging economies (India, Brazil, China) are strong
advocates of pure historical responsibility, which would place relatively light obligations on
them. Still, not only the EU’s high unilateral reduction pledge seems to be driven partly by
fairness considerations, but also China’s insistence on fair burden sharing sometimes contra-
dicts its economic interests (Stalley 2012). Whether used in good faith or not, fairness
arguments often dominate climate negotiations (International Institute for Sustainable
Development 2012a).
Besides economic self-interest, domestic public support is a motive for governments to
defend a particular burden sharing principle. Governments are unlikely to commit to an
agreement that will be hard to implement domestically. Any effective international climate
change agreement directly affects individual citizens through domestic policy measures, and
may thus face substantial resistance. Among other factors, public support depends on if and
how normative fairness criteria influence individual burden sharing preferences. In the exper-
iments reported below I investigate empirically whether individuals generally tend to minimize
their own burden, or whether they take fairness principles into account during burden
allocation.
3 Experiment 1: capacity and vulnerability
3.1 Methodology choice
I use interactive lab experiments with monetary incentives to study burden sharing preferences.
My goal is not to model international climate negotiations inside the lab—a formalized game
consisting of a few one-shot interactions would be a strong oversimplification of a negotiations
setting. Rather, my aim is to infer individuals’ preferences by observing their experimental
behavior. The experiment is thus structured to fit this purpose, and not to simulate a negotiation
process. Recent experimental evidence moreover indicates that fairness principles are salient
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not only in repeated interactions with long-established relationships (like real international
negotiations), but in anonymous one-shot interactions as well (e.g. Cappelen et al. 2013,
2010).
Participants’ payouts are determined by their behavior during the experiment, so that their
decisions on the allocation of mitigation burden have direct and tangible consequences. Online
Resource 1 compares this revealed-preference approach to other methods, discusses use of
monetary incentives and lab experiments’ external validity, and provides technical details of
both experiments.
3.2 Design and hypotheses
Instead of dividing up an amount of money as in the simple ultimatum game, players decide
how to split the costs of climate change mitigation.2 Participants are randomly grouped into
pairs with one proposer and one responder. Each player receives an initial endowment of
“Experimental Currency Units” (ECU). Figure S1 (Online Resource 1) shows game and
payoff structures of both experiments.
The proposer suggests how to split the total cost of climate change mitigation (10 ECU)
between himself and the responder. If the responder accepts, the “burden sharing agreement” is
implemented and each player’s share is subtracted from her endowment. If the responder
rejects, no mitigation is undertaken and a “catastrophic climate event” occurs with a fixed
probability of 50 %, where each player loses a certain part of her endowment. Such catastrophe
threats are common in experimental designs on climate change (Milinski et al. 2008; Tavoni
et al. 2011). Even if most effects of climate change are expected to be gradual, this setting is
not unrealistic. Climate scientists have identified potential thresholds or “planetary boundaries”
whose crossing could have irreversible and relatively sudden catastrophic effects (Rockstrom
et al. 2009; Schneider 2004), and economists have modeled how the prospect of climate
catastrophes affects the feasibility of an international climate agreement (Barrett and
Dannenberg 2012; Barrett 2013).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions or a baseline
(control) group. In the baseline group, both endowment and percentage of endowment lost in
case of a catastrophe (“loss rate”) are equal for proposer and responder (30 ECU and 50 %).
The treatment conditions vary the differences between proposer and responder in those
variables (Table S1). In the two capacity conditions, the proposer is poorer than the responder
or vice versa (endowments 30 vs 15 ECU). In the two conditions that combine capacity and
vulnerability, the proposer is poorer and has a higher loss rate than the responder, or vice versa
(loss rates 2/3 vs 1/3 of endowment). I selected these combinations because they are empiri-
cally most prevalent. Poor countries tend to be highly vulnerable to climate change not merely
due to their low capacity, but their geographical location and other factors (Füssel 2010).
During the explanation of the game, players received a brief introduction to climate change
and the burden sharing issue. In the corresponding treatment conditions, the texts additionally
mentioned capacity and vulnerability differences (sample text and screenshots in Online
Resource 1). Endowment sizes, loss rates, and all other parameters, as well as the game
outcome, are common knowledge within each pair of players. Each participant plays three
rounds, being matched anonymously with a different partner each time (Online Resource 1
2 Public goods games are often used for studying diverse aspects of global climate governance in the lab
(Milinski et al. 2008; Sturm and Weimann 2006). However, I consider the ultimatum game setting more useful in
my case, as offers and acceptance/rejection in a one-shot game should more directly reflect basic underlying
preferences.
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discusses potential learning effects). Role and endowments are assigned anew each round
(each player was at least once proposer and once responder). Online Resource 1 provides mean
payouts.
After the experiment participants answered a short questionnaire on their behavior in the
game and what they would have considered a fair offer by the proposer. It further contained a
few items on environmental preferences, climate change knowledge, and prior participation in
lab experiments, to enable controlling for these individual characteristics in later analysis.
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) which purely rational actors should play, the
proposer offers to pay the lowest amount for which the responder is better off (in expectation)
if he accepts rather than rejects3; and the responder accepts this offer. In the baseline condition,
this is 3 ECU (the responder’s expected payoff if she rejects is 0.5*30+0.5*15=22.5,
accepting the offer leaves her with 30−7=23). However, the experimental literature shows
that proposers tend to offer around half the amount to be distributed, or a little less, and
responders tend to reject offers below that (e.g. Oosterbeek et al. 2004). I thus expect proposers
in the baseline condition to offer to pay on average 5 ECU or slightly less, and responders to
accept most offers equal or higher than that.
If capacity difference influences burden sharing preferences, I expect rich proposers to offer
on average more than 5 ECU, and poor proposers less than 5 ECU (SPE offers are 7 and 3,
respectively). Rich responders should more readily accept offers lower than 5 ECU than in the
baseline condition, and poor responders should be less likely to accept offers around 5 ECU.
If vulnerability works as a needs-based fairness criterion, rich, little-vulnerable proposers
should offer even larger shares than in the corresponding capacity condition, and vice versa for
poor, highly-vulnerable proposers. Again, this expectation should be reflected in responders’
likelihood to accept. However, vulnerability might also mitigate the influence of fairness
principles. If this is the case, I expect rich, little-vulnerable proposers to offer somewhat less
than in the corresponding capacity condition, and poor, highly-vulnerable proposers to offer
somewhat more, as proposers recognize that poor, highly-vulnerable players are in a weaker
position for rejecting offers. Rich, little-vulnerable responders should then be less likely than in
the corresponding capacity condition to accept offers below 5 ECU; and poor, highly-
vulnerable responders should tend to accept offers less favorable to them than in the corre-
sponding capacity condition. SPE offers are 5 ECU in both conditions, with the responder
indifferent between accepting and rejecting (assuming risk-neutral actors).
It should be noted that the distance between SPE and a “fair” split potentially affects
proposers’ behavior (e.g. with an SPE of 1 instead of 3 in the baseline, proposers might be less
inclined to offer the fair split of 5). SPE offers moreover vary together with treatment. Since
parameter choice is influenced by several game structure aspects desirable for appropriately
reflecting country differences that might invoke fairness norms, this problem is to some degree
unavoidable. Thus, while differences between treatment conditions are of primary interest
when analyzing results, size and significance of differences between each treatment condition’s
SPE and observed behavior have to be examined, too.
3.3 Results
Figure 1 summarizes proposers’ mean offers in each treatment condition. Standard deviations
are small except in the high-capacity, low-vulnerability proposer group. Group sizes were 48,
51, 48, 48, and 39, respectively (number of interactions). In the baseline group, offered shares
3 In the existing treatment conditions, this strategy always implies a higher expected payoff for the proposer than
if he makes an offer the responder should rationally reject.
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are slightly below the equal 5–5 distribution, as expected (t-test for difference between result
and SPE offer: p-value<0.0001).
Effects of the capacity treatments on proposers’ offers are large (Online Resource 1,
Fig. S7). In the low-capacity proposer condition, mean offers were around 2 ECU lower than
in the baseline (p-value 0.00001), and also lower than the SPE (3; p-value 0.0112). In the high-
capacity proposer condition, offers were almost 2 ECU higher than in the baseline (p-value
0.00001)–but lower than the SPE (7; p-value 0.0002). The differences to the baseline results
suggest a strong influence of the ability-to-pay principle.
Effect sizes of the capacity-plus-vulnerability treatments are smaller. A low-capacity, high-
vulnerability proposer offered to pay around 0.5 ECU less than a baseline proposer (p-value
0.1023), whereas a high-capacity, low-vulnerability proposer offered to pay around 0.6 ECU
more (p-value 0.091). The former mean offer differs significantly from the SPE (5; p-value
0.0003), whereas the other does not (p-value 0.3236).
Differences between capacity and capacity-plus-vulnerability treatments are large and
significant. Poor, highly-vulnerable proposers offer to pay 1.6 ECU more than “only-poor”
proposers, and rich, little-vulnerable proposers offer 1 ECU less than “only-rich” proposers (p-
values 0.00001 and 0.0057, respectively). Thus, vulnerability differences mitigated fairness
concerns rather than reinforcing those induced by differing capacities.
Responder acceptance rates are high across treatments (Fig. 2, panel a). Those in the capacity
treatments are slightly lower than in the baseline (p-values for Chi2 tests are 0.084 and 0.1 for
LowCap and HighCap, respectively). Still lower are those in the capacity-plus-vulnerability
treatments (p-values 0.007 and 0.002 for LowCap, HiVul and HiCap, LowVul, respectively).
To obtain uncertainty estimates for these differences, I run permutation tests of the Chi2
estimates. Resulting standard errors and confidence intervals are small relative to the point
estimates and corroborate the initial results (Table S2).
Relating proposer to responder behavior, I compare accepted offers between treatments
(Fig. 2, panel b). Their means are only slightly higher than means of all offers. The notable
exception is the high-capacity, low-vulnerability proposer condition, where the mean accepted
offer is around 1 ECU higher than the mean of all offers (significant at 0.05 level, t=2.023). In
this group, responders also strongly deviate from the subgame-perfect equilibrium decision.
Vulnerability therefore appears to be a stronger fairness criterion for responders than for
proposers (Section 5).
Fig. 1 First experiment: mean share proposers offered to pay by treatment condition
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4 Experiment 2: historical responsibility
4.1 Design and hypotheses
The second experiment closely resembles the first in structure. However, in order to credibly
endow all participants with an individual “emissions history”, there is a preliminary, non-
interactive stage before the ultimatum game. Participants start with a uniform 8 ECU endow-
ment to avoid effects from different starting conditions. They then simulate growth in their
“one-person economy” by choosing between “high growth” and “low growth” over 5 rounds.
Choosing low growth in one round increases the endowment by 1 ECU; choosing high
growth, by 5 ECU. Each round of high growth increases climate catastrophe risk by 5
percentage points. As this is common knowledge, the experiment resembles the post-1990
situation when there was sufficient knowledge about greenhouse gas emissions’ effects.
After the fifth round, players begin the ultimatum game with their accumulated wealth
(possible values between 13 and 33 ECU) and historical responsibility for climate catastrophe
risk (between 0 and 25 %). Since participants are randomly matched in pairs, difference in
historical responsibility is randomly assigned. The ultimatum game proceeds as in the first
experiment–except that the probability of catastrophe varies across pairs. It is calculated as the
sum of both players’ historical contributions and a 15 % baseline risk (thus ranging from 15 %
to 65 % in 5 % increments). Participants play three independent rounds, always starting again
with their endowment and historical responsibility determined in the preliminary stage.
Vulnerability is fixed at a 0.5 loss rate.
If historical responsibility affects preferences, I expect offered burden allocations to be
more asymmetric the larger the difference in responsibility is, with those having contributed
more to climate risk offering to pay larger shares. Responders should tend to accept offers
where proposers pay at least a share commensurate with their relative contribution to climate
risk.
4.2 Results
Since climate risk contributions and endowments are determined by individual choices in the
preliminary stage, they vary across participants. Mean endowment is 28.6 (Std. dev. 5.09).
Median risk contribution is 20 %, resulting in a median probability of 55 % for a climate
catastrophe across all pairs.
Fig. 2 Responder behavior, first experiment. Panel a: share of accepted offers by treatment condition. Panel b:
mean proposer cost shares of accepted offers by treatment condition
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Offers increase in line with proposers’ relative to responders’ contribution to climate risk,
indicating that historical responsibility is a salient fairness criterion (Fig. S8). I estimate an
OLS regression with proposer offer as dependent variable, and difference in historical respon-
sibility as independent variable (defined as proposer’s minus responder’s contribution to
climate risk). Control variables are total group climate risk and ratio of proposer’s and
responder’s endowment.4 To adjust for non-independence within participants across different
rounds, standard errors are clustered on the proposer.
The coefficient of responsibility difference is positive and significant at the 1 % level, that
of total climate risk at the 5 % level. Adding an interaction between endowment ratio and
difference in responsibilities does not substantively change these results, except that climate
risk turns insignificant (Table S3). Figure 3 shows substantive effects estimated from simula-
tions of the above regression (with interaction term). Offers rise by 0.87 ECU for a 5 %
increase in responsibility difference. For the simulations I used Clarify (Tomz et al. 2003).
For the responder side, I estimate a logistic regression with responder’s acceptance as
dichotomous dependent variable. Independent variables are responsibility difference and
proposer offer, with total climate risk and endowment ratio as controls. Standard errors are
clustered on the responder. An alternative model (R2) includes an interaction between
endowment ratio and responsibility difference. Since the effect of responsibility difference
could vary depending on the value of the offer, a third model (R3) adds an interaction between
these variables.
The effect of the proposer’s offer on the probability to accept is always positive and
significant at the 1 % level–unsurprisingly, higher offers are more likely to be accepted. The
effect of responsibility difference is negative as expected: higher relative responsibility of the
proposer reduces the likelihood of acceptance. While it is significant at the 5 % level in the
simple model R1, it turns insignificant in R2 and R3, suggesting that historical responsibility
affects responders’ decisions only weakly. Total climate risk is significant at the 5 % level in all
three models. The interaction term between offer and responsibility difference in R3 is not
statistically significant, suggesting that the impact of differences in historical responsibility is
not contingent on the size of the proposer’s offer (Table S4).
In the post-experiment questionnaires, participants described motivations for their behavior
that corroborate the findings from both experiments, in particular the influence of capacity and
responsibility differences on burden sharing preferences (details in Online Resource 1).
5 Discussion
The results indicate that a capacity-related fairness norm strongly influences burden sharing
preferences. This is true for rich as well as poor players. Not only do poorer proposers offer
substantially less than when endowments are equal, but richer proposers offer more.
Furthermore, rich responders also largely accept lower offers from poorer proposers. The larger
effect of the low-capacity compared to the high-capacity proposer treatment on the offer suggests
that capacity differences are especially salient for fairness perceptions of those who are on the
disadvantaged side. This is also indicated by the higher mean of accepted offers than of all offers
in this treatment condition. Normative theorists’ advocacy of the ability-to-pay principle (Baer
4 Controlling for participant characteristics and preferences (measured in the post-experiment questionnaire)
could increase estimates’ efficiency, as those variables might influence the offer. Omitting them does however not
bias the estimates, since all independent variables depend on choices of both proposer and responder and are
therefore unlikely to correlate with personal characteristics of the proposer.
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2013; Caney 2005) is thus clearly reflected in participants’ behavior. Rich players’ higher offers
are also consistent with observations from public goods experiments, where richer participants
contributed larger amounts (e.g. Brekke et al. 2012; Tavoni et al. 2011).
Including vulnerability differences does not seem to induce needs-based fairness norms.
Instead, the results bolster my counter-hypothesis stating that vulnerability differences can
mitigate other fairness considerations. Theoretical needs-based fairness arguments as proposed
e.g. by Adger and Nicholson-Cole (2011) or Baer (2013) appear not to have strong traction in
individuals’ preferences. The results may however be more in line with empirical observations
of self-serving bias both in experiments and real-world climate negotiations (e.g. Brekke et al.
2012; Lange et al. 2010). Both poor, highly vulnerable and rich, little vulnerable participants
appear to take into account the weaker position of highly vulnerable players for rejecting an
offer. Poor, highly vulnerable players offer almost the baseline share, presumably because their
incentive to avoid catastrophe is higher. Knowing that, rich, little vulnerable proposers make
lower offers than “only-rich” proposers. However, poor, highly vulnerable responders rejected
a considerable number of these lower offers (compare Fig. 1 and 2b).
One possible explanation is that needs-based fairness is more important to disadvantaged
actors if they have less influence on the burden-sharing outcome. Responders’ agency
opportunities are lower than proposers’, since they are second movers who can only accept
or reject a given cost distribution. Disadvantaged proposers might be prepared to make a
higher payment offer to ensure acceptance and avoid catastrophe, since this offer is at least
their own decision. But disadvantaged responders simply confronted with a low, “unfair” offer
might tend to reject such unfair treatment, regardless of the potential material consequences.
These potential implications of vulnerability differences have, to my knowledge, been largely
unaddressed in the theoretical literature. Potentially counterproductive interactions between
different fairness principles, as discovered in this experiment, should furthermore be taken into
account when developing burden sharing proposals combining several fairness norms, as in
Caney (2010) or Baer et al. (2009).
Historical responsibility also has a strong influence on burden sharing preferences. The
higher proposers’ relative contribution to climate risk, the larger the share they offer to pay.
Fig. 3 Simulated marginal effects of independent variables on offered proposer share (OLS regression with
interaction between responsibility difference and endowment ratio). Responsibility difference and total climate
risk are increased from their median by 0.05, endowment ratio from its median by 0.2. Dots indicate point
estimates, whiskered lines 95 % confidence intervals
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Responsibility differences do not seem to have a strong direct effect on responders’ likelihood
to accept. This could be partly a result of the often high endowments, making it cheaper to pay
even a relatively large share than to risk losing a substantial amount, regardless of fairness
criteria. However, likelihood of acceptance is strongly influenced by offer size. While this is
unsurprising, to the degree that these offers already “price in” responsibility differences–which
seems to be the case in the experiment–the absence of a separate effect of responsibility
differences on responders’ decisions might be expected. In sum, the responsibility principle
strongly endorsed by theorists (e.g. Caney 2005; Gosseries 2004; Hayward 2012) appears to
prominently influence empirical burden sharing preferences, too. One should note, though,
that the experimental structure obviated some problems in practically applying the principle
(Section 2.1), potentially making it easier to follow.
Examining participants’ motivations as stated in the post-experiment questionnaire corrob-
orates the inferences discussed above. Whereas in the capacity and responsibility treatments a
large majority listed fairness as a main reason for their decisions, only few respondents in the
capacity-plus-vulnerability treatments related fairness to vulnerability (see Online Resource 1).
6 Conclusion
Disagreement about burden sharing in global climate governance is one of the main issues
stalling the UNFCCC negotiations. Several fairness principles have been put forward to guide
a more differentiated allocation of the mitigation and adaptation burden. This study has
focused on three commonly cited fairness criteria–ability to pay, vulnerability, and historical
responsibility–and examined experimentally whether and how these criteria influence individ-
ual preferences for burden sharing.
Individuals cared strongly about fairness when allocating mitigation burden in the exper-
iment. This was especially true for those participants that had lower capacity or lower
responsibility than the player they faced, but those in the more “advantageous” position also
acted broadly in line with fairness norms. Participants offered and accepted cost distributions
that reflected asymmetries in capacity, indicating the salience of the ability-to-pay principle.
Differences in historical responsibility were also a strong determinant of offered cost distri-
butions, as participants that had contributed more to climate risk offered to pay more. The
weaker position highly vulnerable participants had, however, reduced the influence of fairness
norms relative to pure self interest and induced offers more unfavorable for highly-vulnerable
players. Still, they often rejected too unfair offers, showing that individuals at a disadvantage
tend to insist on fairness even if they risk large losses by doing so.
Overall the findings show individual burden sharing preferences to strongly reflect equity-
based, but less so needs-based fairness principles from normative theory. Empirically they are
consistent with findings from earlier experiments on climate governance, and extend these by
using a new game structure, including vulnerability, and endogenizing historical responsibility.
The usual caveats for lab experiments apply regarding generalizations and policy implica-
tions. Student behavior in highly formalized games should not be extrapolated one-to-one to
actual international negotiations. Besides replicating the results with a socially more diverse
sample, it would be interesting to run experiments in several countries that differ in their
negotiating position on burden sharing. Still, the findings suggest that UNFCCC parties would
do well to work towards a burden sharing agreement that takes into account capacity, historical
responsibility, and vulnerability in an explicit and differentiated way. While there are undoubt-
edly several other factors strongly influencing negotiation success, this would be one step in
making an ambitious climate treaty more acceptable to many countries and their citizens.
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The vulnerability results suggest a worrying potential implication. On the one hand, if poor,
vulnerable countries cannot benefit from needs-based fairness considerations, but rather their
weak bargaining position is exploited, ambitious policy demands from AOSIS or others are
unlikely to be fruitful. Poor, vulnerable responders’ behavior on the other hand suggests that
those countries will hardly submit to an agreement they deem grossly unfair. To avoid
continued negotiation deadlock, it may be inevitable that rich countries with high historical
responsibility open up towards developing countries’ proposals, offering to carry a larger share
of the burden.
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